Introduction
In the very early months of 1950 the management of Magyar Pamutipar, a leading Budapest textile factory, began to alter the system by which the factory maintenance staff were paid. Prior to that date they had been paid according to work targets that were established at the level of the group; thus the collective rather than the individual was measured in order to establish the basis of remuneration. The authorities were especially keen to see that the individual became the unit on which the wage was established. The rhetoric of their justification for this shift was surprisingly anticollectivist -without individual norms, or work targets, individual contributions to the economy could not be measured. Furthermore, work discipline could not be maintained if good workers within a group were to be remunerated at the same level as the bad and the lazy 1 
.
It has been widely assumed that Stalinism was highly collectivist both in its ideology and in its practice. It has been seen as being at an extreme of a state socialist paradigm characterised by the elimination of individual civil rights, property rights and in some variants the abolition of a distinction between public and private spheres altogether.
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The contradiction between the apparent assumption of "individualisation" that characterised socialist wage systems and the collectivist ideology of the regime in Hungary was noticed in the later socialist period. Miklós Haraszti commented on how "in one newspaper, a Hungarian expert on "management science" claimed that payment-by-results was the ideal form of socialist wages. It was, he said, the embodiment of the principle "from each according to his capacity, to each according to his work". But in another issue of the same paper a veteran communist who now holds a high position warmly remembered a former comrade in arms who had been prominent before the war in the organisation of workers' demonstrations against the Bedeaux system -the "scientific" system of payment by results then in force" In these accounts, therefore, economic reform under state socialism creates space through which workers are able to exercise considerable countervailing power on the shop floor. This assumption is maintained through an implied contrast between the reformist state of the late socialist period and the despotic state of the Stalinist years which is able to subordinate industrial workers to its political programme on the shop 
workers to the goals of the plan. These systems of remuneration were individual rather than collective, suggesting at the heart of classical central planning lay an apparent paradox between institutional centralisation and a high degree of individualisation at the point of production 6 . Embodied in wage systems was a specific attempt to discipline the individual worker through using a specific "politics of time". This aimed to force workers to use every minute of working time to produce goods as laid out in the plan, to speed up their work, improve their productivity and constantly surpass the goals of the plan. The implementation of this system led to a breakdown of social solidarity between workers, as the industrial workforce became increasingly fragmented. It was not, however, the state's "politics of time", something similar to the Republic is work". In addition it laid down the principle that all citizens of the new state had an obligation "to work according to their ability" in order to participate in "the construction of socialism". In assessing the particular obligation of each citizen "the Hungarian People's Republic attempts to realise the socialist principle "from each according to their ability, to each according to their need"". This obligation to work amounted to the participation of each citizen in the economic life of the country. The constitution clearly stated that "the economic life of the Hungarian People's Republic is determined by the state people's economic plan". Therefore the economic plan was, at least in theory, the institution that regulated the labour obligation of each and every citizen in the new state. As such it was to be much more than a means of regulating the performance of the economy, though, of course, it was also very much this. It aimed to calculate the contribution of every citizen to the generation of the social to the mixture of instruction, incentives and regulations that were issued by higher Comprehensive Soviet style economic planning sought to re-define the role of the enterprise turning it from the legally autonomous entity of capitalist society into a mere administrative level within the planning process. The first manifestation of this shift was the beginning of the process of "profilisation" in 1948. This essentially meant that every enterprise, so that its production range would be transparent to central planner, should have a "profile", a range of products for which it had exclusive or near exclusive responsibility. Enterprises lost production units that produced goods which came under different industrial directorates, or even ministries The individual producer was central to the planning process. In particular the individual was central to the process of labour planning. In an economy that was not driven by fully autonomous firms subject to the discipline, at least on a theoretical level, of the market, alternative criteria had to be devised by which enterprises determined how many workers should be employed. The major criterion was that of the degree of labour power that needed to be utilised to produce a particular product.
The level of employment would then become a matter of simple calculation for the planners. They would determine what needed to be produced, the amount of labour power required to produce those goods could then be calculated through scientific The reform of the system of payment-by-results began in January 1948 with the socalled second supplement to the collective agreements of that year. Norms had been in existence since 1945 but these were linked to statistical estimates of previous production in a given plant. In many cases they had been informally established on a decentralised basis at the point of production. As far as the authorities were concerned this was a problem as they sought to control the ways in which the norms were obligations, given that in the forms of labour competition that had existed hitherto "whilst the factories had globally joined one stage in the labour competition, the degree to which the implementation of particular tasks helped the totality of an enterprise fulfil its work". Not only was individual labour competition designed to provide planners with information on how plans could be individualised, it also formed part of an intensification of the state's drive against traditional work practices.
The state aimed to promote particular individuals within production in order to measure particular work methods that they could then record and use to re-organise production in other factories and base newer, more scientific norms upon such 
This opened up the possibility of a worker working on several different hourly wage rates on the same shift. In many ways it came to resemble a kind of fee for work done, which made it very different from many of the piece-rates existing in capitalist factories. There were several important differences, however, between the piece-rate and a simple contract fee. The first was that the rate was received within the context of an employment relation, theoretically the recipient was not self-employed but was legally a waged worker-citizen. The second was the dual nature of the incentive.
Work was divided into different categories depending on their difficulty that determined the rate. This rate would then be paid on the basis of the worker's fulfilment of their production norm. The interaction of the piece-rate and the norm created a pressure for the worker not only to complete a given number of pieces to make an adequate monthly wage but to constantly strive to complete every piece in the shortest possible time. The intention behind the system was to completely subordinate the worker to the dictates of "clock time"
27
, in order to force the workers to improve their productivity according to the terms set out in the plan. As such it aimed to force workers to maximise the amount of their working time they spent performing productive labour. The third difference was that the worker did receive an hourly wage when they were not working, the rate was often set at a miserably low level by the foreman and linked to the category of work a worker could expect to get In the medium term the major effect of the 1950 norm revision was to create norms that were very difficult for workers to make, a situation that was clearly borne out by the statistics from late 1950 on the proportion of workers not making their norms. In
Újpest in November there were thirteen factories where more than 20% of the workforce failed to make 100% of their norms. In the district's textile factories a majority of the workforce failed to make them; in one factory the proportion of those failing to reach their norm stood at 73.6%. In the Danube Shoe Factory where 32% failed to reach their norms another 20% only just made them. The whole process of norm revision did not lead to undifferentiated cuts in wages, nor in performance.
Indeed it seems that the process led rather to the sharpening of inequalities between individual workers and between brigades, almost independent of their skill or their formal position within the division of labour. On one construction site in the capital soon after the introduction of the new norms, the average fulfilment rates of the bricklayers varied at between 70 and 169%, the range for carpenters was between 53 and 139%, whilst for unskilled workers it stood at between 32 and 130%. This was also true of other sectors, in the Danube Shoe Factory, where the majority of the workforce were either unable or only just able to make their norms there were just over 10% of the workforce who were able to achieve rates of over 150%, and a small number who able to achieve rates as high as 180%.
This inequality existed partially as a consequence of keeping Stakhanovism alive.
With the fall off in support for the labour competition that accompanied norm revision Severe disorganisation of production caused by persistent raw material shortages led to continual work stoppages in textiles also; in the Cotton Textile Spinning Plant these accounted for 9.31% of total working hours in June, 9.98% in July, and 12.87% in . This led to a situation where only around 50% of skilled workers at 41 The cumulative effect of each of these essentially systemic problems was that even with very lax norms, the percentage of those failing to reach 100% in ministry controlled industry was always high; it stood at 15.5% in June 1953
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. What was more important, however, was that the constant pressure of the plan target combined with a persistent problem of shortage to change the way in which management attempted to utilise labour. This had profound implication for workers' own experiences of work and for the rhythms of production. Management attempted to "flexibly" deploy labour across the territory of an enterprise, forcing workers to take differing jobs, with different wage rates depending on the state of production. In the had been trained, but due to raw material shortages could not be given work appropriate to their training. As a result they were shifted to different jobs within the enterprise. Such "flexibility" had negative consequences for their earnings. It was estimated that in October 1953 instead of earning the standard wage of 800 Forints a month, they earned only 400-500 Forints instead. This, it was reported, severely hindered the smooth operation of the internal labour market within the enterprise 51 .
Such strategies met with serious worker discontent. In the Ózd Metallurgical Works one skilled worker complained to a party committee that "there are shops where, because of material shortage, they transfer work group leaders, brigade leaders, and outstanding workers. That means that they get unskilled workers wages, they can't even earn 800 or 900 Forints"
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.
There was another side to the problem of stoppages. When the raw materials arrived or when the deadline for plan fulfilment neared, management would need to draw on reserves of time and labour to make up the previous shortfall. This would often be done through the use of campaign style methods. In sectors producing for export because of the poor quality of much of the production, 40-50% of the quarterly plan would be produced in the last month, and of this 40-50%, 55-60% was produced in the last ten days of the last month 53 . Forms of the labour competition and related "work" movements could be used to help the enterprises cope with the problem. In the Danube Shoe Factory the reorganisation of the export warehouse was done on Sunday and classified by the enterprise management as "social" work, so that overtime payment could be avoided 54 .
During such periods overtime increased, in many factories unlawfully. In the construction sector, the total expenditure on overtime pay increased by 200,000
Forints from July to August 1953. In the Láng Machine Factory in September of that year plan fulfilment of the monthly plan in the first ten days stood at 10%, yet made up the production lag in the second ten with the aid of overtime, which had averaged over the year at 30 to 50,000 hours in every month 55 . At such times the demand for overtime fell on different categories of workers, with high working hours being particularly demanded of those workers whose position in the internal division of labour of the plant meant that the maintenance of continuous production was dependant on them. For some workers overtime became a constant part of working life. In the KISTEXT Textile Factory the demand for overtime fell disproportionately on both administrative workers and manual workers in the maintenance shop 56 . In sugar production, the shortage of engineers meant that it was often necessary for technical workers to work for eight hours on Sunday without a rest day, in order to guarantee the conditions for production during the following week. In spite of this situation the central authorities refused to allow overtime to be paid for such work, creating enormous problems for the enterprise 57 . In those sectors where this was required the enterprise became dependent on the "flexibility" of certain categories of worker, and this relationship of dependence was sometimes successfully exploited by the workers concerned.
Above all the unpredictable and uneven rhythms of production combined with the pressure of the wage system undermined remuneration as a mechanism for binding the worker to the plan. Indeed the operation of the "shortage" economy that had come into being during the early 1950s had a rhythm and a calendar of its own that was impenetrable to the will of the worker, one governed by the dialectic of shortage and at the end of plan cycle, the rush, as raw materials arrived. This was to form the context against which workers were able to exercise a degree of countervailing power even at the height of Stalinism in Hungary.
Informal Bargaining and the Particularisation of Working Class Identity
By the end of the Stalinist era in 1953 the attempt to use the wage system to persuade the worker to produce more quickly had been destroyed by the different rhythms of production created by the operation of the economy at shop floor level. The demands that the plan imposed upon enterprise management combined with the environment of shortage created a chaotic situation in production but simultaneously gave a degree of countervailing power to the workforce. The environment in which production occurred and the strategies workers adopted to exercise this countervailing power had consequences for the social identities adopted by industrial workers. The workplace had become an arena for considerable shop floor bargaining fed by managements' need to accommodate workers to cope with the demands of production in a shortage economy and worker rejection of the official wage system.
Many of the more blatant forms that this bargaining took were simply called "norm cheating" by the central apparatus. One form was the abuse of the innovation movement, that was often found in the metalworking sector to disguise short cuts in the production of each piece, a practice that often led to declining quality. Such "norm cheating" often took the form of the abuse of elements of the labour competition. In the Diósgyõr Steel Mills unskilled workers supplying the furnace were able to earn wages 50% higher than normal by engaging in "shock work". These workers officially left their workplace and were simply re-employed by the enterprise as shock workers, performing their original job, in order to gain higher wages. There were cases reported of workers abandoning the enterprise completely and simply living as shock workers as a result. In other cases "cheating" took the form of the foreman changing the size of the job done on paper in order to raise the wages of the workforce. In the Sztálinváros Brick Factory the foreman simply reported that 2-300 tons more bricks had been produced than was actually the case. On the Nagyatádi construction site the wage fund had been overspent by 147,000 Forints in August
1953. This was due largely to enterprise management that had paid for 2,500 square metres of plastering, as well as the haulage of 770,000 bricks, 825 cubic metres of mortar, and 390 cubic metres of concrete. This work had only ever been completed on . In mining, low pay for maintenance workers relative to other sectors was a major cause of discontent among the workers. Monthly wages were as low as 500-600 Forints for some workers in the sector 68 . Such a lack of standardised payment gave workers considerable scope to employ informal bargaining strategies to increase their wages. In one pharmaceuticals plant, for example, maintenance workers simply refused to complete work when the enterprise management refused to offer them pay for supplementary time 69 . Superimposed on to the fragmentation of the industrial workforce was a process that can best be described as the particularisation of worker identity, that contributed to Growing official concern about the indiscipline and low skill level of the many new recruits had created spaces which small groups of workers could use to secure preferential treatment from management. One union official in a western Hungarian mining town admitted giving preferential treatment to small groups of more experienced workers when applying work discipline regulations. He stated that because he believed that "new workers are the ones who absent themselves … if an old worker with 18 to 20 years service to the pit came to the factory management almost crying to ask that they don't penalise him for being absent, then of course with such an old and honest worker we wouldn't use a severe penalty, but with new workers who go absent, we are strict"
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. Such spaces were exploited by small groups of workers to bargain informally with management over wages, access to tools and raw materials and over the implementation of work discipline regulations using attributes of skill and experience to secure favourable treatment. Such attributes were cultural constructs and their successful deployment served to exclude workers on the basis of gender, generation and social origin from access to favourable positions within informal wage bargaining. Needless to say this process was deeply subversive of class solidarity among industrial workers, though neither did it allow the state to enforce its authority on the shop floor 76 .
Conclusion
This examination of the attempts of the Stalinist regimes in post-war Hungary to discipline labour by binding industrial workers to economic plans through individualised systems of remuneration underpinned by a specific "politics of time"
demonstrates that such policies were strikingly unsuccessful. Instead the major determinant of work rhythms appears to have been the operation of the "shortage economy" itself. Despite of this mismatch between state-led intervention and the actual operation of the economy, the institutions that the state used, that is the wage system, to ensure that "time" acted as a stick in order to raise productivity, remained in place. As a result these attempts became the base for a struggle, largely informal, on the shop floor as workers attempted to find ways to reconcile the time embodied in the wage system with the "rhythm" of the shortage economy as a means of boosting their earnings.
This discussion of wage determination and factory regimes in the context of early Socialist Hungary has three important implications for how Stalinism is studied, both generally and in its East-Central European context. The first and most important implication is that the analysis presented here suggests that approaches which stress the dominance of the state in socialist society have misread reality. This article argues for the primacy of the realm of the material over the intentions of the political, given the way in which the intentions of state rationalisers foundered on the reality of the shortage economy. Though this economy was undoubtedly the consequence of state action it is difficult to maintain that its perverse functioning was an intended goal of this intervention. These "rhythms" caused state-led rationalisation to founder at a shop floor level. The focus on the material, as opposed to the political dimensions of the Stalinist order, also points out how a repressive state was able to prevent the tensions this failure created assuming a "formal" nature. The struggles on the shop floor around remuneration were not public, but informal. What is more bargaining tended to accept the rules of the game on the shop floor; it was often about bargaining over the right to maximise earnings from scarce work, rather than protest about the scarcity of work itself.
This point feeds through into the second major implication of the analysis presented here. In opposition to the traditional view of Stalinism as collectivist and monolithic, this article has shown how state policy could, at least in the realm of the economy, seek to individualise social actors. This process of individualisation occurred at the level of policy, in the way that the economic plan was designed to be broken down to the individual producer, at the level of institutions, through the wage system or labour competition, and to some extent at the level of social response. The actions of the state in the realm of production undermined social solidarity. This outcome was reinforced by the operation of the shortage economy and worker responses to it, which heightened fragmentation of the industrial workforce, undercut the appeal of social solidarity, and provided the material base for the particularisation of worker identity.
The third implication of the analysis presented here is more historical, and applies explicitly to Stalinism in its East-Central European, and more particularly its Hungarian context. It has been widely assumed that during the 1960s and 1970s a monolithic Stalinism gave way to a more liberal, less despotic regime which allowed greater room for an autonomous social action. The emergence of a tolerated informal economic sector and greater economic freedom have been attributed to this wave of reform, something, which it is commonly argued, affected the system changes in the region in 1989-90. In some accounts informal co-operation between workers and managers within the context of "hegemonic" factory regimes, to use Michael Burawoy's term, was a product of reform. The account presented here suggests that such institutions emerged under high Stalinism itself, and were due not to reform from 
